

in Lesotho, although sometime I would come in and out, but—into South Africa— But they used— Immediately I came out they became very active and rushed to the place, because they knew I would do the proper job.

NOW WHEN DID POQO—EXCUSE ME, I CAN'T PRONOUNCE IT CORRECTLY—WHEN DID POQO FIRST BEGIN TO MOBILIZE?

It started, I mean I built it in September '62.

BEFORE YOU BECAME ACTIVELY INVOLVED AGAIN, WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE OF THE REMNANTS OF PAC ORGANIZATION DOING ANYTHING?

Well, the organizational work was still there, but no program yet had been decided. But the people were still trying to get Mr Molete and some few members outside to try and decide on a program, particularly the regions, but nothing could be done until when I came out

WHERE WAS MOLETE?

Molete was in Evaton,

HE WASN'T JAILED?

He wasn't! We sent him out, we paid his bail, we sent him out in order to go and act for the President.

I SEE.

That's right,

CAN YOU DESCRIBE HOW POQO WAS BUILT?

It's very difficult, but as I say, it was built by— I instructed the task force, I again constituted(?) task force, and get it to work out a method where they can form up groups of fighters with pangas [machetes] and revolvers and explosives and other things. And that they must rely on their own efforts. They can steal weapons, they can get people who can sharpen these pangas, or themselves— Buy from backdoor from people who can sell these things, and then we can be able to raid the stations and places for arsenals where there are weapons, and so on. And Poqo its course would be to kill or be killed. The motto of Poqo was kill or be killed. And that in fact even some suicide squads were formed so that the [inaudible] could be.

WHAT WAS THE—

Almost on the basis of the Mau Mau, but in a more intensified and extreme manner.

WHAT WAS THE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION?

Well, the means of communication was for people to walk from place to place. But then at that time, people used to come to my headquarters and so on. And unfortunately they organized so many people in the [inaudible] to an extent that we even got the police spies, and they even knew the day when we were going to fight. So we were [inaudible] from these actions, because I think the mistake— We had not studied guerilla methods, of constituting a guerilla unit, an armed force, how to operate and so on. So I

think because many people joined the party at the time, it was so flooded(?) that we got into trouble. And that's how we had difficulties.